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UNHCR News Story: Generous Pakistani civilians donate food, other aid and cash to displaced

UNHCR News Story: Generous Pakistani civilians donate food, other aid and cash to displaced

A displaced mother and her children rest at a reception centre in Mardan district after fleeing the Swat Valley. © UNHCR/H.Caux

Generous Pakistani civilians donate food, other aid and cash to displaced

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, May 26 (UNHCR) – The unprecedented flood of people displaced by fighting in north-west Pakistan is triggering an outpouring of generosity from Pakistani civilians.

The UN refugee agency, which is delivering assistance to tens of thousands of displaced people in camps and elsewhere in the community where they are seeking refuge, is witnessing countless acts of charity by private citizens.

In North West Frontier Province’s (NWFP) Jalozai camp, for example, a single donor has given enough flour, sugar, spices, tea, and flavoured syrup for some 2,400 people.

Elsewhere, citizens are bringing food, clothes and mattresses to the thousands of families staying in schools. One woman, now resident in Islamabad but originally from the NWFP district of Mardan, travels every weekend to her home town carrying cash that she collects from her friends in the capital to give to displaced people staying in schools. She also brings clothes and tea.

"Our whole family got involved in this story," she told UNHCR earlier this week. "We also invited all families originally from Mardan and living in Islamabad to give us cash to buy items for IDPs (internally displaced people)," the woman added.

"We won’t get tired of having them with us," said another woman in Mardan, whose family is hosting eight displaced people in their communal room, providing them with food and mattresses. "These people are from our country."

These are tough times in northern Pakistan. According to provincial government authorities, the number of displaced people from the Swat, Lower Dir and Buner districts registered since May 2 in a fast track process has now reached more than 2.38 million, though those figures are being cross-checked and verified in a second stage process, and may change.

On average in these districts, some 18,000 families, about 126,000 people, are registered every day by local authorities. Many others are still trapped in the conflict zone. Each time the government lifts the curfew, thousands rush to flee.

A bus ride from the Swat district town of Mingora to Mardan town has tripled (from 2,000 rupees, or US$24, to 6,000 rupees), according to people escaping the area. An old man from Barikot in Swat Valley, who arrived Tuesday with his family in Mardan district, said he was forced to sell his only cow – for less than a quarter of the price he paid for it – in order to cover the busfare from his village to a safer area.

About 10 percent of the displaced are living in camps and the rest are staying with friends or in communal buildings. UNHCR is providing assistance to people in camps as well as those living outside camps.

To provide shelter from the oppressive heat, UNHCR is working with the government authorities to build separate shaded communal areas for men and women in Jalala, Sheikh Yaseen, Sheikh Shahzad and Yar Hussein camps. In Sheikh Shazad, workers have set up 14 shaded areas, half for men and the other half for women. In those sectors where electricity has been installed, communal spaces have electric water coolers and electric points for fans, lighting and recharging of electrical devices such as mobile phones.

UNHCR has started to distribute bricks to each family to build individual kitchen stoves in the camps as well. The stoves will allow the displaced people to cook their own meals with rations from the World Food Programme. Up to now, the government has provided people with cooked meals through private contractors. In this project, UNHCR is working with its partner the Communal Development Programme.

UNHCR is also stepping up its assistance to people residing in schools in Mardan and Swabi districts. In the Mardan area, UNHCR teams have almost completed assessments of 448 schools, and distribution of relief items is under way to 4,500 families, or about 37,000 people.

On Saturday, UNHCR’s relief supplies for its operation in north-west Pakistan were bolstered by a 36-tonne consignment of tents, plastic rolls, kitchen sets, jerry cans, soap, generators, water tanks and purification equipment donated and airlifted to Islamabad by the Italian government.

Meanwhile, the Relief Bank set up by UNHCR in the NWFP town of Nowshera has been receiving in-kind donations from private donors, ranging from sleeping mats to water coolers.

UNHCR is continuing to buy more supplies from within Pakistan and to ship items from stockpiles around the world. However, UNHCR urgently needs funds to accelerate the purchase of relief supplies for its operation. On Friday, as part of a larger joint UN appeal, UNHCR called for another US$84 million for its operation helping displaced people in north-west Pakistan until the end of 2009.

For women like Kharo, a government worker who fled her village in Swat and is now staying with her family in a school in Mardan, the assistance from Pakistanis and UNHCR cannot come too quickly. "I am so grateful that people from Mardan are providing us with food," she said.

By Ariane Rummery in Islamabad and Helene Caux in Peshawar, Pakistan

Posted by UNHCR on 2009-05-27 12:07:55

Tagged: , children , IDPs , Pakistan , south-west asia , web story 26 May 2009 , NWFP , North-west fronntier province , conflict , displacement , displaced , civilians , donation , food , aid , cash , relief , help , solidarity , Swat Valley , internal displacement , geotagged , geotag , world map , world , atlas , carte , location

Classic Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

Classic Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

This snow is really exceptional, located less than fifty miles northwest of the city of Cusco in south central Peru. It is the highest mountain of the Cordillera Vilcabamba. Because of its proximity to the city, it is easily accessible and is climbed frequently. Join us on this incredible Hiking Tour to Machu Picchu. Book early.

INCLUDES
– Transfers In / Out
– Transportation CuscoMollepata. (Start walking)
– Professional bilingual tour guide English / Spanish.
– Assistant tour guide (for groups of 9 or more people)
– Entrance Fee to Machu Picchu.
– 4 breakfasts, 4 lunches, 4 afternoon snacks, 4 dinners. ”Vegetarian (vegan) food on request at no extra cost!
– Cook. (Professional)
– Drinking water along the Salkantay Trail, only on meal times.
– Dining tent with tables and chairs
– 1st Aid Kit
– 01 Oxygen Ball
– Horses (to carry tents, food and cooking equipment)
– Horse men
– Quadruple & waterproof Camping tent “02 people only”
– 01 Sleeping Mattress per person “therma rest”
– 01 night in touristic hostel in Aguas Calientes “Machupicchu Village”.
– Return train tickets in Expedition Service (MachupicchuOllantaytambo and bus to Cusco) transfer to Hotel.

View complete details of tour at Classic Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

Posted by Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu on 2017-04-25 22:35:40

Tagged: , Salkantay , Salkantay Trek , Salkantay Trekking , Salcantay , Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu , Salkantay Trek 5 days , Salkantay Trail , Machu Picchu , Machu Picchu Pueblo , Salkantay Pass , Chonta , Flight of Condor , Mollepata , Soraypampa , Abra de Salkantay , Salkantay Lake

PROSECUTOR v. Charles Taylor (n. 2) – IMG_8351

PROSECUTOR v. Charles Taylor (n. 2)  - IMG_8351

72. At this time there were two plans to attack Freetown, one made by Bockarie
with the Accused, and one made by breakaway AFRC commander Solomon Anthony
Joseph Musa (a.k.a. SAJ Musa), whose troops had started an advance towards Freetown
at the end of June/beginning of July 1998. Consistent with his discussions with the
Accused, Bockarie invited SAJ Musa after the Waterworks meeting to join his efforts to
attack Freetown but Musa refused. However, with SAJ Musa’s death in or around 23
December 1998, when Gullit took over the leadership of the troops at Benguema and
resumed contact with Bockarie, Bockarie and Gullit coordinated in their efforts to capture
Freetown. From that point onwards, SAJ Musa’s original plan was abandoned, and Gullit
followed the Bockarie/Taylor plan, as had been contemplated by Bockarie and the
Accused. During the operation, Bockarie exercised effective command and control over
Gullit, issuing a number of instructions to Gullit, including the order to use terror tactics
against the civilian population on the retreat from Freetown. The Trial Chamber did not
make a finding as to how SAJ Musa was killed, but noted that the possibility of his death
had been mentioned by Bockarie at the time of the Waterworks meeting.
73. The Accused gave advice to Bockarie and received updates in relation to the
progress of the operations in Kono and Freetown in the implementation of their plan.
Bockarie was in frequent contact via radio or satellite phone with the Accused in
December 1998 and January 1999, either directly or through Benjamin Yeaten. Yeaten
also travelled to Sierra Leone to meet with Bockarie in Buedu during this period.
However, it is not clear that the Accused had any level of control over the conduct of
these operations. Of the instructions allegedly given to Bockarie by the Accused during
this period, only one was proved beyond reasonable doubt, that being that the Accused
instructed Bockarie to transfer some of the Pademba Road prisoners to Buedu. This
finding is insufficient to establish, as the Prosecution has alleged, that the Accused
directed or had control over the Kono and Freetown operations in December 1998 and
January 1999.
74. In addition to planning and advising on the Kono-Freetown operation, the
Accused also provided military and other support. He facilitated the purchase and
transport of a large shipment of arms and ammunition from Burkina Faso in around
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November 1998 which was used in the attacks on Kono and Kenema in December 1998,
where further arms and ammunition were captured. These arms and ammunition were in
turn sent to the troops in Freetown in January 1999 and also used by the RUF and AFRC
in joint attacks on the outskirts of Freetown. The Accused also sent personnel in the form
of at least four former Sierra Leone Army (SLA) fighters who participated in the attack
on Kono, as well as 20 former NPFL fighters who were part of the forces under the
command of Gullit that entered Freetown, and a group of 150 fighters with Abu Keita (a
former ULIMO member), known as the Scorpion Unit, who participated in the attack on
Kenema.
75. During the Freetown operation, the Accused’s subordinates in Liberia also
transmitted “448 messages” to RUF forces to warn them of impending ECOMOG jet
attacks. These messages originated in both Sierra Leone and Liberia.
Operational Support
76. In addition to support for specific military operations, the Accused provided to the
RUF, and the RUF/AFRC alliance, communications support, financial support, military
training, technical support and other operational support. Of these, communications
support, facilitation and transport of materiel and personnel and the provision of a
guesthouse to the RUF were sustained and significant.
77. Concerning communications assistance, following the invasion of Sierra Leone in
1991, the NPFL provided radio operators and equipment to the RUF with the knowledge
of the Accused. NPFL radio operators were sent to Sierra Leone and trained RUF fighters
in radio communication. Some of these radio operators stayed in Sierra Leone following
the break with the NPFL in Operation Top Final, and the RUF continued to benefit from
the training and equipment provided by the NPFL throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone
and during the Indictment period.
78. The Accused gave Sam Bockarie a satellite phone in October 1998. Bockarie also
received “top up cards” for phone credit from Benjamin Yeaten. The Accused also gave a
satellite phone to Issa Sesay in 2000, albeit with full knowledge of the ECOWAS leaders.
The supply of such satellite phones enhanced the communications capability of both
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Bockarie and Sesay, which they used in furtherance of RUF and RUF/AFRC military
activities. Sesay, for example, used a satellite phone to report to Bockarie that Kono was
under RUF control. While Foday Sankoh was also given a satellite phone, the
Prosecution failed to prove that the phone came from the Accused.
79. In addition to providing communications training and equipment to the RUF, the
Accused and his subordinates facilitated communications for the RUF through their own
communications network. The RUF/AFRC was provided access to radio communications
equipment in Liberia by the Accused or his subordinates. This equipment was used by
RUF radio operators to communicate with the RUF, in one instance concerning supplies
of military equipment, and in another to update Bockarie on events in Sierra Leone when
he was in Liberia. A radio was provided by the Accused to Johnny Paul Koroma.
However, this radio was used specifically for the purpose of enabling Koroma to
communicate with the West Side Boys about the UN peacekeepers that they had taken
hostage. The evidence did not establish that the Accused and Yeaten received updates
during the Freetown invasion from an RUF operator stationed in Liberia.
80. Although the establishment of the infrastructure and the training of RUF radio
operators occurred prior to the Indictment period, the ongoing support from the Accused
and his subordinates through the provision of satellite phones, the use of the NPFL
communications infrastructure, and the transmission of “448” messages alerting the RUF
to imminent ECOMOG attack, collectively enhanced the communications capacity of the
RUF/AFRC during the Indictment period, and its capacity to carry out military operations
in which crimes were committed.
81. In relation to the guesthouse, the Trial Chamber finds that from 1998 to 2001 the
Accused provided a base for the RUF in Monrovia, equipped with a long-range radio and
telephone, RUF radio operators, SSS security supervised by Benjamin Yeaten, cooks and
a caretaker. Although the guesthouse was used by RUF members partly for matters
relevant to the peace process or for diplomatic purposes, it was also used to facilitate the
transfer of arms, ammunition and funds directly from the Accused to the RUF, and the
delivery of diamonds from the RUF directly to the Accused, belying his testimony that he
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was entirely unaware of what occurred at the guesthouse. The RUF guesthouse provided
a base for the RUF in Monrovia, which facilitated the regular transfers of arms and
ammunition from the Accused to the RUF, as well as diamonds from the RUF to the
Accused, transactions which played a vital role in the military operations of the RUF in
which crimes were committed.
82. The Trial Chamber further finds that during the Indictment period, the Accused
provided much needed road and air transportation to the RUF of arms and ammunition
into RUF territory. Materiel was also escorted across military checkpoints by security
personnel working for the Accused, including Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), Joseph
Marzah (a.k.a. Zigzag), and Sampson Weah. This facilitation of road and air
transportation of materiel, as well as security escorts, played a vital role in the operations
of the RUF/AFRC during a period when an international arms embargo was in force.
83. The Accused also provided financial support, military training, technical support
and other operational support to the RUF, including medical support. In most instances in
which the Accused provided financial support, the funds given by the Accused to various
individuals were for unspecified or personal use. The evidence failed to establish that the
10 million CFA francs given by the Accused to the RUF in Côte d’Ivoire, or the $USD
15,000 given by him to Sesay to support the RUF, were used to facilitate arms and
diamond deals. However, the Accused did give funds to Bockarie, in the tens of
thousands of dollars, to buy arms and ammunition from ULIMO. The RUF received
financial support for arms and ammunition from sources other than the Accused as well.
84. Similarly, while the Accused provided other forms of support to the RUF,
including medical support, and he acknowledged that he permitted injured RUF fighters
to get treatment in Liberia, it is not clear how continuous or substantial the provision of
medical care was throughout the Indictment period. In preparation for the Fitti-Fatta
mission in mid-1998, the Accused sent ‘herbalists’ who marked fighters in Buedu and in
Kono in order to bolster their confidence for the mission to recapture Kono. Other
support included the provision of goods such as food, clothing, cigarettes, alcohol and
other supplies to the RUF by the Accused. The evidence is insufficient to enable the Trial
20
Chamber to judge the quantity of supplies provided. Other supplies for the RUF came
from Liberia through other channels unrelated to the Accused.
85. With regard to military training and technical support, the Accused instructed
Bockarie in 1998 to open a training base in Bunumbu, Kailahun District, and told him
also in 1998 that the RUF should construct or re-prepare an airfield in Buedu. However,
the Prosecution failed to prove that the Accused sent Martina Johnson, a former NPFL
artillery commander, to Buedu to train RUF fighters to use a 40-barrel missile gun.
86. The Accused provided safe haven to RUF fighters, including Mike Lamin, when
they crossed into Liberia after the retreat from Zogoda in 1996, but the Accused was not
found to have ordered the RUF combatants to cross into Liberia. He had not yet taken
office as President at that time, however, and the Prosecution failed to prove that he
facilitated documentation to enable Lamin to travel to Côte d’Ivoire.
Arms and Ammunition
87. Turning to the allegations of the Prosecution relating to the role of the Accused in
providing military support to the RUF/AFRC, the Trial Chamber first considered two
preliminary issues raised by the Defence, one relating to the status of the border between
Sierra Leone and Liberia, and the other relating to disarmament in Liberia. The Trial
Chamber finds that at no relevant time in the Indictment period was the ECOMOG
presence on the Liberia/Sierra Leone border, or the official closure of the border by the
Liberian government, sufficient to prevent the cross-border movement of arms and
ammunition. With regard to the claim that as a result of disarmament and the destruction
of arms, as well as the arms embargo, Liberia had insufficient arms and ammunition to
supply Sierra Leone, the Trial Chamber finds that despite these measures, the Accused
was able to obtain arms and had the capacity to supply arms and ammunitions from
Liberia to the rebel groups in Sierra Leone. Moreover, he had the capacity to facilitate
larger arms shipments through third countries. Of the arms shipments to the RUF and
AFRC linked to the Accused during the Indictment period, the largest arrived not from
Liberia, but through Liberia from third party states, primarily Burkina Faso.
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88. The Accused directly supplied arms and ammunition to the RUF/AFRC, as well
as facilitating the supply of arms and ammunition to the RUF/AFRC from outside
Liberia. During the Junta period, the Accused sent ammunition to Bockarie via Daniel
Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) in 1997. The Accused was the source of the materiel delivered by
Tamba, Joseph (a.k.a Zizgag) Marzah and Sampson Weah, among others, to Sierra Leone
throughout 1998 and 1999, such supplies consisting of both arms and ammunition.
Bockarie himself made trips to Liberia in 1998 and 1999 during which he obtained arms
and ammunition from the Accused. During Issa Sesay’s leadership of the RUF, the
Accused continued to deliver arms and ammunition to the RUF in 2000 and 2001 via
Tamba, Marzah, Weah and others. Sesay himself made trips to Liberia, including a trip in
May 2000 and at least two trips in the second half of 2000 and early 2001, during which
he obtained arms and ammunition from the Accused.
89. Although the materiel delivered through, inter alia, Tamba, Weah and Marzah
was limited in quantity, certain shipments provided by the Accused on Bockarie’s trips to
Liberia in 1998 and 1999 did contain sizeable amounts of materiel.
90. After 14 February 1998, the Accused sent Varmuyan Sherif to open a corridor
between Lofa County and RUF-held territories to facilitate the trade of arms and
ammunition between the RUF/AFRC and ULIMO. As a result, members of ULIMO who
were supposed to disarm and surrender their arms to the UN, instead sold or bartered
them to the RUF. The Accused also provided financial support to the RUF/AFRC in
order to facilitate their purchases of arms and ammunition from ex-ULIMO combatants.
However, the evidence was insufficient to establish that the Accused attempted to help
the RUF purchase arms and ammunition from ECOMOG and ULIMO prior to the Junta
period.
91. The Accused facilitated two large shipments of ammunition. The first occurred in
late 1997. In around September 1997, the Accused sent Ibrahim Bah to Freetown to meet
with Sam Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma to make arrangements for the procurement
of arms and ammunition. Bah was given 90 carats of diamonds and $USD 90,000 to pay
for the shipment. This shipment of arms and ammunition was delivered by plane to
22
Magburaka in Sierra Leone sometime between September and December 1997 and was
distributed amongst members of the AFRC/RUF Junta. Materiel from this shipment was
used by the AFRC/RUF forces in fighting ECOMOG and SLPP forces in Freetown
before, during and after the Intervention, in the Junta mining operations at Tongo Fields
prior to the ECOMOG Intervention, in “Operation Pay Yourself” and subsequent
offensives on Kono, as well as in the commission of crimes during those operations.
92. The Accused also facilitated a shipment of materiel around November 1998 from
Burkina Faso. Ibrahim Bah and Musa Cissé, Charles Taylor’s Chief of Protocol,
accompanied a delegation led by Bockarie to Burkina Faso where a shipment of arms and
ammunition was arranged and brought back by plane to Liberia, and then transported by
trucks provided by the Accused to Sierra Leone. The Trial Chamber finds that the
Accused was instrumental in procuring and transporting this large quantity of arms and
ammunition for the RUF, that he was paid for it with diamonds, and that he kept some of
the shipment for his own purposes. The shipment from Burkina Faso was unprecedented
in volume and, as noted previously, was critical in the December 1998 and January 1999
offensives.
93. The Trial Chamber considered the Defence submission that other sources of
military equipment for the RUF and AFRC far outweighed supplies allegedly provided
by the Accused. In addition to receiving arms and ammunition from the Accused, the
RUF and the AFRC also obtained supplies from the existing stockpiles of the former
government when they took over power in May 1997, by capturing them from ECOMOG
and UN peacekeepers, and through trade with ULIMO, AFL and ECOMOG
commanders. However, these sources of materiel were of minor importance in
comparison to those supplied or facilitated by the Accused. Significantly, the RUF/AFRC
in fact heavily and frequently relied on the materiel supplied and facilitated by the
Accused; the Accused’s support often satisfied a need or request for materiel at a
particular time; and shipments of materiel supplied by or facilitated by the Accused often
contributed to and were causally linked to the capture of further supplies by the RUF and
AFRC. Although there were instances in which the materiel that the Accused gave to the
RUF/AFRC was more limited in quantity, on a number of occasions the arms and
23
ammunition which he supplied or facilitated were indispensable for the RUF/AFRC
military offensives. The materiel provided or facilitated by the Accused was critical in
enabling the operational strategy of the RUF and the AFRC during the Indictment period.
94. On the basis of its findings, more detailed in the written Judgement, the Trial
Chamber rejects the Defence argument that Benjamin Yeaten, the Director of the
Accused’s Special Security Service, to whom the arms couriers reported, was engaged in
the trade of arms and ammunition for the RUF independently and without the knowledge
of the Accused.
Military Personnel
95. As previously noted, approximately 20 former NPFL fighters who had been
integrated into the Armed Forces of Liberia formed part of a group of approximately 200
fighters led by O-Five who attacked and committed crimes in Karina and Kamalo in
Bombali District on or about August/September 1998. Subsequently, this group of 20
fighters was incorporated into the Red Lion Battalion, which was comprised of 200
fighters and was part of a larger group of up to approximately 1,000 fighters who
attacked and committed crimes in Waterloo, Fisher Lane, Hastings, Freetown Eastern
Police, Pademba Road Prison, Kingtom, Fourah Bay and Upgun in Freetown and the
Western Area, on or about December1998/January 1999. These 20 fighters were sent by
the Accused from Liberia to Sierra Leone where they joined the RUF/AFRC forces in
Sierra Leone and participated in attacks in which crimes were committed.
96. The Trial Chamber finds that Abu Keita and the reinforcements known as the
Scorpion Unit were sent by the Accused to Sierra Leone and participated in the attack on
Kenema, in which Abu Keita committed crimes. The Kenema attack was part of the
attack on Kono and Freetown. Although the evidence did not establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the Scorpion Unit was sent for the purpose of fighting in the Kono and
Freetown military operations, which included Kenema, Daniel Tamba, on behalf of the
Accused, approved Bockarie’s decision to integrate the Scorpion Unit under his
command.
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97. The Accused sent former SLA soldiers to the Bunumbu training camp soon after
the Intervention, although their subsequent deployment was not established. The Accused
later sent a group of former SLA soldiers from Liberia back to Sierra Leone to support
the attack on Freetown. These men arrived in Kailahun in or around late November
1998, and they participated in the attack on Kono in December 1998, although they were
unable to reach Freetown and did not participate in the Freetown attack.
98. Liberian government authorities and RUF/AFRC members recruited and forced
Sierra Leonean refugees residing in Liberia to return to Sierra Leone to fight. However,
the evidence did not establish that these civilian refugees participated in attacks in Sierra
Leone.
99. The Trial Chamber considered the allegation by the Prosecution that the Accused
assisted the AFRC/RUF by capturing and returning AFRC/RUF deserters to Sierra
Leone. The Trial Chamber finds that the Liberian police authorities detained two
RUF/AFRC members Fonti Kanu, and Dauda Aruna Fornie, and handed them over to
RUF personnel in late 1998 and late 1999, respectively. In evidence about his own arrest
and torture in Sierra Leone, Mohammed Kabbah described as common knowledge the
cooperation of Liberian authorities and the RUF on the return of wanted Sierra Leoneans
who escaped to Liberia.
Diamonds
100. The Trial Chamber finds that there was a continuous supply by the AFRC/RUF of
diamonds mined from areas in Sierra Leone to the Accused, often in exchange for arms
and ammunition.
101. During the period May 1997 to February 1998 diamonds mined in Kono and
Tongo Fields were delivered from the AFRC/RUF to the Accused by Daniel Tamba
(a.k.a. Jungle) in exchange for arms and ammunition.
102. Following the ECOMOG Intervention, from February 1998 to July 1999, the
diamonds delivered to the Accused by Sam Bockarie directly, as well as indirectly
through intermediaries such as Eddie Kanneh and Daniel Tamba, were given to him in
25
order to get arms and ammunition from him, or sometimes for “safekeeping” on behalf of
the RUF.
103. From February 1998 to July 1999, diamonds were delivered to the Accused by
Sam Bockarie directly. These diamonds were delivered to the Accused for the purpose of
obtaining arms and ammunitions from him. During this period, diamonds were also
delivered through intermediaries such as Eddie Kanneh and Daniel Tamba.
104. The RUF also traded diamonds with entities and individuals other than the
Accused or his government. Testimonial evidence of specific involvement of the Accused
in the trade of diamonds supported the findings of a United Nations report of a panel of
experts that diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone to Liberia was “the bulk of the RUF
trade in diamonds” and while difficult to quantify was nevertheless the “primary source
of income to the RUF”. This report concluded that the trade of diamonds between Liberia
and Sierra Leone could not be conducted in Liberia “without the permission and the
involvement of government officials at the highest level.”
105. From July 1999 to May 2000, Foday Sankoh delivered diamonds to the Accused,
and diamonds were delivered to the Accused on his behalf in or before 1999 while he was
in detention. In March 2000, Foday Sankoh visited South Africa and travelled through
Monrovia on his way back to Sierra Leone, meeting with the Accused in Monrovia.
According to one witness, among the diamonds delivered to the Accused during this
meeting were a 45 carat diamond and two 25 carat diamonds.
106. From June 2000 until the end of hostilities in 2002, Issa Sesay delivered diamonds
to the Accused, including on one occasion a 36 carat diamond. Eddie Kanneh also
delivered diamonds to the Accused on Sesay’s behalf. Sometimes the diamonds were
delivered to the Accused supposedly for “safekeeping” until Sankoh’s release from
detention and, at other times, in exchange for supplies and/or arms and ammunition.
During this period, diamond trading between the RUF and persons other than the
Accused also took place.
26
107. As detailed in documentary evidence before the Trial Chamber, Liberian
diamonds are generally known to be of a significantly lower quality than diamonds from
Sierra Leone, refuting the claim made by the Accused that he would have had no reason
to trade in diamonds from Sierra Leone because Liberia had its own diamonds.
Moreover, the documentary evidence indicates that export of diamonds from Liberia was
far greater than Liberian diamond production, attributing the difference to diamonds from
Sierra Leone smuggled through Liberia.
108. The Trial Chamber finds that the Accused also facilitated a relationship between
the RUF and a Belgian known as Alpha Bravo for the purpose of diamond transactions.
However, there was insufficient evidence to establish that the Accused facilitated a
relationship between the RUF and other diamond dealers.
109. The Accused also provided diesel fuel for the Caterpillars at the diamond mining
sites in Sierra Leone, and equipment for use in mining diamonds to the RUF on at least
one occasion between 1998 and 2002. While there may have been multiple sources of
mining equipment and fuel entering Sierra Leone during the Indictment period, the
Accused was among them. The Trial Chamber has also found that men sent by the
Accused visited at least one mining site and assessed mining operations.
110. While there was evidence of occasional inquiries from Benjamin Yeaten and
reports to him about the activity at the mining sites in Sierra Leone, the evidence did not
establish that regular updates were sent to the Accused about mining activity.
The Peace Process
111. The Trial Chamber will now summarize its findings relating to the role of the
Accused in the peace process and the Defence contention that his involvement with the
RUF/AFRC was solely for the purpose of promoting peace.
112. During a radio conversation with Foday Sankoh, following the attack on Sierra
Rutile in 1994, the Accused advised the RUF leader to send an External Delegation to
Côte d’Ivoire. In Côte d’Ivoire, the delegates met Musa Cissé, an NPFL representative,
who allowed them to use his radio for communications with Sankoh. The Accused,
27
through contact with Musa Cissé, invited members of the External Delegation to Liberia,
where he met them twice in 1995. In December 1995 the Accused met members of the
External Delegation in Cote d’Ivoire on the occasion of the publication of “Footpaths to
Democracy”, at which time he gave them CFA 10 million francs for their maintenance.
113. The Accused instructed Foday Sankoh to participate in the Abidjan peace talks
from March to November 1996 in order to obtain ammunition and materiel for the RUF.
The evidence established that while in Abidjan, Sankoh obtained arms and ammunition
for the RUF using funds from Libya. However, the evidence was insufficient to establish
that Sankoh used contacts of the Accused to obtain arms and ammunition in Abidjan.
114. The Accused played an active role in the Lomé peace negotiations, which role the
Prosecution alleged to be subversive, suggesting that the Accused improperly assisted
and advised the RUF delegation before and during the negotiations so as to procure the
most favourable outcome for RUF/AFRC and himself. The Trial Chamber did not find
this to be the case, in the absence of evidence that the Accused controlled the RUF
delegation or dictated the outcome of the negotiations. However, the evidence established
that the Accused was engaged in arms transactions at the same time that he was involved
in the peace negotiations in Lomé, publicly promoting peace at the Lomé negotiations
while privately providing arms and ammunition to the RUF.
115. Following the Lomé Peace Accord, the so-called West Side Boys, discontent with
the apparent exclusion of the AFRC from the peace process, kidnapped UN peacekeepers
and others in Sierra Leone and demanded to talk to, and then see, Johnny Paul Koroma,
their leader. The Accused officially and publicly made arrangements to bring Koroma to
Monrovia, including negotiating a waiver of the UN travel ban, and facilitating several
meetings, thereby playing a central role in bringing Koroma and Sankoh together and
achieving a reduction in the tension between the RUF and the AFRC. The evidence
establishes, as the Accused contends, that the UN and ECOWAS Heads of State knew
about his public role in the negotiations. Taylor’s influence with both Koroma and
Sankoh evidently made him a significant actor in the process and helped to facilitate the
28
release of the UN peacekeepers and others who had been taken captive by the West Side
Boys.
116. The Trial Chamber accepts that as President of Liberia, as a member of the
ECOWAS Committee of Five (later Committee of Six), the Accused wielded
considerable influence over the warring factions in Sierra Leone and that the ECOWAS
heads of state played a substantial role in the Sierra Leone peace process. However, there
is strong evidence showing that while publicly participating in regional efforts to broker
peace in Sierra Leone, the Accused was secretly fuelling hostilities between the
AFRC/RUF and the democratically elected authorities in Sierra Leone. This clandestine
undermining of the peace process by the Accused occurred even when he knew that an
arms embargo by the UN and ECOWAS was in force in the region.
117. In late April or early May 2000, the RUF forcibly disarmed and detained a group
of approximately 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. The Accused was asked
by ECOWAS to become involved in negotiations for the release of these hostages, and
his mandate was endorsed by the United Nations. Thereafter, the Accused invited Issa
Sesay, RUF interim leader, to Monrovia to discuss the matter of their release. After this
meeting, from about the middle to the end of May 2000, the RUF released the captured
UNAMSIL peacekeepers into Liberian territory in stages. The Trial Chamber found that
the Accused had significant influence over the RUF decision to release the UN
peacekeepers, and that in his meeting with Issa Sesay, Taylor promised him assistance
“in the struggle”. While the Trial Chamber found that Issa Sesay made a trip to Liberia in
May 2000 in which he obtained arms and ammunition from the Accused, the evidence
was insufficient to establish that this materiel was provided in exchange for Issa Sesay
agreeing to release the UNAMSIL peacekeepers.
118. In July 2000, a meeting was convened in Monrovia to discuss the selection of new
leadership for the RUF following Sankoh’s imprisonment. The meeting was attended by
all of the ECOWAS heads of state and an RUF delegation led by Issa Sesay where it was
proposed that Sesay take over as Interim Leader of the RUF. In another meeting late that
night, the Accused privately advised Issa Sesay to say that he would disarm but “not do it
29
in reality”. At that time, the Accused was supplying Sesay with arms and ammunition,
and also calling on the RUF to send forces to help him fight his own enemies together
with the AFL in Liberia and in Guinea.
119. The Trial Chamber accordingly finds that while the Accused publicly played a
substantial role in the Sierra Leone peace process, including as a member of the
ECOWAS Committee of Five (later Committee of Six), secretly he was fuelling
hostilities between the AFRC/RUF and the democratically elected authorities in Sierra
Leone, by urging the former not to disarm and actively providing them with arms and
ammunition, acting, as the Prosecution described, as “a two-headed Janus”.
Leadership and Command Structure
120. The Trial Chamber has considered the leadership and command structure of the
RUF, and the role of the Accused, if any, in relation to that structure. The Trial Chamber
has found that Foday Sankoh and the Accused met in Libya in the early 1990s and
pursued parallel goals and aspirations, but not in a chain of command. Following
Operation Top Final in 1992 and the withdrawal of NPFL troops from Sierra Leone,
contacts and cooperation between the Accused and Sankoh continued, but to a lesser
extent. The Accused asked Sankoh to send troops in 1993 to help him fight ULIMO. He
advised Sankoh prior to and following the RUF attack on Sierra Rutile, and he advised
Sankoh to send an External Delegation to Cote d’Ivoire.
121. When Foday Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria in March 1997, he instructed Sam
Bockarie to take orders from the Accused. While much evidence was adduced relating to
the trade of arms and diamonds between Sam Bockarie and the Accused, the evidence did
not establish that Bockarie took orders from the Accused. The instructions given to
Bockarie by the Accused were given with the inherent authority the Accused had by
virtue of his position. Bockarie was deferential to the Accused and generally followed his
instruction. However, the Trial Chamber considers that the role Sankoh envisioned for
the Accused while he was in detention was that he would guide Bockarie, and that
Bockarie should look to his guidance, not that the Accused should take over Sankoh’s
role as the leader of the RUF with effective control over its actions.
30
122. Sometime around March 1998, Sam Bockarie was promoted. The Prosecution
alleged that this promotion was made by the Accused directly, or through a joint decision
between himself and Johnny Paul Koroma. Bockarie had just returned from Monrovia.
The Trial Chamber finds that the Accused may well have been consulted by Koroma, or
talked directly with Bockarie about the promotion while he was in Monrovia, but not that
Bockarie was promoted by the Accused. Like Sankoh, Koroma turned to the Accused for
advice and support, and the Trial Chamber accepts that he would have consulted the
Accused. Nevertheless, the Accused was not part of the command structure.
123. In December 1999, Sam Bockarie left Sierra Leone and went to Liberia, amidst
violent clashes between RUF fighters loyal to Foday Sankoh and RUF fighters loyal to
him. He was told to leave Sierra Leone by the Accused, but the Trial Chamber finds that
in summoning Bockarie to Liberia, the Accused relied on the authority of ECOWAS and
sought the help of President Obasanjo, organizing a meeting at Roberts International
Airport between Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, President Obasanjo and himself, as a
result of which a decision was made that Bockarie would not return to Sierra Leone until
the disarmament process had been completed.
124. On 26 July 2000 a meeting took place at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia
between the heads of state of ECOWAS and an RUF delegation led by Issa Sesay, where
the suggestion was made that Issa Sesay should become the Interim Leader of the RUF.
Sesay would not accept the appointment without it first being approved by the RUF and
Foday Sankoh. A meeting of RUF commanders was held, and a letter was also delivered
to Foday Sankoh by President Obasanjo seeking Sankoh’s consent to the appointment.
At a follow up meeting in August 2000, Sesay was confirmed as the RUF Interim Leader.
Presidents Obasanjo and Konare both met with Sankoh in Freetown, without the Accused
present, and the Trial Chamber finds that this process was undertaken by ECOWAS
heads of state collectively, rather than the Accused unilaterally.
125. The Accused called on the AFRC/RUF to assist him in fighting outside Sierra
Leone. In 1999, the Accused ordered Bockarie to send AFRC/RUF forces to assist him in
his fight against Mosquito Spray and the LURD forces that had attacked his forces. In
31
2000 and 2001 the Accused instructed Issa Sesay to send RUF forces. The RUF forces
sent in response to these requests fought alongside AFL forces in Liberia and Guinea
under the command of the Accused’s subordinates. The evidence was insufficient to
establish that in 2001, Bockarie left Liberia to fight for Taylor’s allies in Cote d’Ivoire, as
alleged by the Prosecution.

Posted by VascoPress Comunicações on 2012-04-27 10:58:18

Tagged: , CharlesTaylor , SierraLeone , NaçõesUnidas , ONU , UN , UnitedNations , l’OrganisationdesNationsUnies , Diplomacy , Diplomacia , ForeignAffairs

Classic Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

Classic Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

This snow is really exceptional, located less than fifty miles northwest of the city of Cusco in south central Peru. It is the highest mountain of the Cordillera Vilcabamba. Because of its proximity to the city, it is easily accessible and is climbed frequently. Join us on this incredible Hiking Tour to Machu Picchu. Book early.

INCLUDES
– Transfers In / Out
– Transportation CuscoMollepata. (Start walking)
– Professional bilingual tour guide English / Spanish.
– Assistant tour guide (for groups of 9 or more people)
– Entrance Fee to Machu Picchu.
– 4 breakfasts, 4 lunches, 4 afternoon snacks, 4 dinners. ”Vegetarian (vegan) food on request at no extra cost!
– Cook. (Professional)
– Drinking water along the Salkantay Trail, only on meal times.
– Dining tent with tables and chairs
– 1st Aid Kit
– 01 Oxygen Ball
– Horses (to carry tents, food and cooking equipment)
– Horse men
– Quadruple & waterproof Camping tent “02 people only”
– 01 Sleeping Mattress per person “therma rest”
– 01 night in touristic hostel in Aguas Calientes “Machupicchu Village”.
– Return train tickets in Expedition Service (MachupicchuOllantaytambo and bus to Cusco) transfer to Hotel.

View complete details of tour at Classic Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

Posted by Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu on 2017-05-03 23:06:18

Tagged: , Chonta , Salkantay , Salkantay Trek , Salkantay Trekking , Salcantay , Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu , Salkantay Trek 5 days , Salkantay Trail , Machu Picchu , Aguas Calientes , Lake , La Playa

1st Regiment Advanced Camp CIF Charlie/Delta

1st Regiment Advanced Camp CIF Charlie/Delta

Cadet Brienno Illari, Virginia Military Institute, First Regiment Advanced Camp, checks over equipment issued to him at Central Issue Facility (CIF) on Fort Knox, Ky., May 26. CIF issues equipment to Cadets that will be used during their 31 day training. (Photo by Mattie Cook)

Posted by armyrotcpao on 2017-05-26 16:41:28

Tagged:

CLASSIC SALCANTAY TREK TO MACHU PICCHU 5D

CLASSIC SALCANTAY TREK TO MACHU PICCHU 5D

This snow is really exceptional, located less than fifty miles northwest of the city of Cusco in south central Peru. It is the highest mountain of the Cordillera Vilcabamba. Because of its proximity to the city, it is easily accessible and is climbed frequently. Join us on this incredible Hiking Tour to Machu Picchu. Book early.

The Salkantay Trek 5 days is the number one alternative to the Inca Trail and the classic one, with high snow-capped mountains, lowland jungle and a visit to the inca jungle. This trek offers a perfect mix of trekking, culture and nature.

INCLUDES
– Transfers In / Out
– Transportation CuscoMollepata. (Start walking)
– Professional bilingual tour guide English / Spanish.
– Assistant tour guide (for groups of 9 or more people)
– Entrance Fee to Machu Picchu.
– 4 breakfasts, 4 lunches, 4 afternoon snacks, 4 dinners. ” Vegetarian (vegan) food on request at no extra cost!
– Cook. (Professional)
– Drinking water along the Inka trail, only on meal times.
– Dining tent with tables and chairs
– 1st Aid Kit
– 01 Oxygen Ball
– Horses (to carry tents, food and cooking equipment)
– Horse men
– Quadruple & waterproof Camping tent “02 people only”
– 01 Sleeping Mattress per person “therma rest”
– 01 night in touristic hostel in Aguas Calientes “Machupicchu Village”.
– Return train tickets in Expedition Service (Machupicchu – Ollantaytamba and bus to Cusco) transfer to Hotel.

View complete details of tour at Salcantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

Posted by Salcantay Trek on 2017-06-17 14:44:56

Tagged: , Salcantay Trail , Salcantay Trek , Salcantay Trek to Machu Picchu , Salkantay Trek , Salcantay Pass , Salcantay , Salkantay , Abra de Salkantay

SALKANTAY TREK AND INCA TRAIL TO MACHU PICCHU 7D/6N

SALKANTAY TREK AND INCA TRAIL TO MACHU PICCHU 7D/6N

Our classic Salkantay Trek is an alternative to the traditional Inca Trail to Machu Picchu. The Sacred path is a cutting edge experience for adventure travelers looking for a little more privacy and authenticity. With more spectacular views, the Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu offer a quiet and rich contemplation of Nature.

INCLUDES
– Transfers In / Out
– Transportation Cusco-Mollepata. (Start walking)
– Professional bilingual tour guide English /Spanish.
– Assistant tour guide (for groups of 9 or more people)
– Entrance Fee to Machu Picchu.
– 6 breakfasts, 6 lunches, 6 afternoon snacks, 6 dinners. ” Vegetarian (vegan) food on request at no extra cost!
– Cook. (Professional)
– Drinking water along the Inka trail, only on meal times.
– Dining tent with tables and chairs
– 1st Aid Kit
– 01 Oxygen Ball
– Horses (to carry tents, food and cooking equipment)
– Horse men
– Porters (to carry tents, food and cooking equipment)
– Quadruple & waterproof Camping tent “02 people only”
– 01 Sleeping Mattress per person
– Return train tickets in Expedition Service (Machupicchu – Ollantaytambo and bus to Cusco) transfer to Hotel.

View complete details of tour at Salcantay Trek and Inca Trail to Machu Picchu in 7 days

Posted by Salcantay Trek on 2017-07-06 21:30:21

Tagged: , Salcantay Trek , Salcantay Trail , Salcantay Trek to Machu Picchu , Salkantay Trek , Salcantay Pass , Humantay Lake , Soraypampa , Wiñayhuayna , Sayaqmarka

Classic Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

Classic Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

This snow is really exceptional, located less than fifty miles northwest of the city of Cusco in south central Peru. It is the highest mountain of the Cordillera Vilcabamba. Because of its proximity to the city, it is easily accessible and is climbed frequently. Join us on this incredible Hiking Tour to Machu Picchu. Book early.

INCLUDES
– Transfers In / Out
– Transportation CuscoMollepata. (Start walking)
– Professional bilingual tour guide English / Spanish.
– Assistant tour guide (for groups of 9 or more people)
– Entrance Fee to Machu Picchu.
– 4 breakfasts, 4 lunches, 4 afternoon snacks, 4 dinners. ”Vegetarian (vegan) food on request at no extra cost!
– Cook. (Professional)
– Drinking water along the Salkantay Trail, only on meal times.
– Dining tent with tables and chairs
– 1st Aid Kit
– 01 Oxygen Ball
– Horses (to carry tents, food and cooking equipment)
– Horse men
– Quadruple & waterproof Camping tent “02 people only”
– 01 Sleeping Mattress per person “therma rest”
– 01 night in touristic hostel in Aguas Calientes “Machupicchu Village”.
– Return train tickets in Expedition Service (MachupicchuOllantaytambo and bus to Cusco) transfer to Hotel.

View complete details of tour at Classic Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

Posted by Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu on 2017-05-03 23:06:13

Tagged: , Chonta , Salkantay , Salkantay Trek , Salkantay Trekking , Salcantay , Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu , Salkantay Trek 5 days , Salkantay Trail , Machu Picchu , Aguas Calientes , Lake , La Playa

Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

This snow is really exceptional, located less than fifty miles northwest of the city of Cusco in south central Peru. It is the highest mountain of the Vilcabamba Mountain Range. Because of its proximity to the city, it is easily accessible and is climbed frequently. Join us on this incredible Hiking Tour to Machu Picchu. Book early.

INCLUDES
– Transfers In / Out
– Transportation CuscoMollepata. (Start walking)
– Professional bilingual tour guide English / Spanish.
– Assistant tour guide (for groups of 9 or more people)
– Entrance Fee to Machu Picchu.
– 4 breakfasts, 4 lunches, 4 afternoon snacks, 4 dinners. ” Vegetarian (vegan) food on request at no extra cost!
– Cook. (Professional)
– Drinking water along the Salkantay Trail, only on meal times.
– Dining tent with tables and chairs
– 1st Aid Kit
– 01 Oxygen Ball
– Horses (to carry tents, food and cooking equipment)
– Horse men
– Quadruple & waterproof Camping tent “02 people only”
– 01 Sleeping Mattress per person “therma rest”
– 01 night in touristic hostel in Aguas Calientes “Machupicchu Village”.
– Return train tickets in Expedition Service (Machupicchu – Ollantaytambo and bus to Cusco) transfer to Hotel.

View complete details of tour at Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu in 5 days

Posted by Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu on 2017-07-11 23:25:22

Tagged: , Salkantay , Salkantay Trekking , Salkantay Trek , Salcantay , Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu , Salkantay Trek 5 days , Salkantay Trail , Machu Picchu , Machu Picchu Pueblo , Abra de Salkantay , Salkantay Pass , Machu , Picchu , Hidroelectric , Machu Picchu Hidroelectric

SALKANTAY TREK AND INCA TRAIL TO MACHU PICCHU 7D/6N

SALKANTAY TREK AND INCA TRAIL TO MACHU PICCHU 7D/6N

Our classic Salkantay Trek is an alternative to the traditional Inca Trail to Machu Picchu. The Sacred path is a cutting edge experience for adventure travelers looking for a little more privacy and authenticity. With more spectacular views, the Salkantay Trek to Machu Picchu offer a quiet and rich contemplation of Nature.

INCLUDES
– Transfers In / Out
– Transportation Cusco-Mollepata. (Start walking)
– Professional bilingual tour guide English /Spanish.
– Assistant tour guide (for groups of 9 or more people)
– Entrance Fee to Machu Picchu.
– 6 breakfasts, 6 lunches, 6 afternoon snacks, 6 dinners. ” Vegetarian (vegan) food on request at no extra cost!
– Cook. (Professional)
– Drinking water along the Inka trail, only on meal times.
– Dining tent with tables and chairs
– 1st Aid Kit
– 01 Oxygen Ball
– Horses (to carry tents, food and cooking equipment)
– Horse men
– Porters (to carry tents, food and cooking equipment)
– Quadruple & waterproof Camping tent “02 people only”
– 01 Sleeping Mattress per person
– Return train tickets in Expedition Service (Machupicchu – Ollantaytambo and bus to Cusco) transfer to Hotel.

View complete details of tour at Salcantay Trek and Inca Trail to Machu Picchu in 7 days

Posted by Salcantay Trek on 2017-07-06 21:30:35

Tagged: , Salcantay Trek , Salcantay Trail , Salcantay Trek to Machu Picchu , Salkantay Trek , Salcantay Pass , Humantay Lake , Soraypampa , Wiñayhuayna , Sayaqmarka